Intelligence Studies Review

Dr Kevin Riehle

Since the beginning of 2024, NATO military leaders have stated in multiple forums that NATO countries need to prepare for future war with Russia.

• On 8 January, Civil Defence Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin warned “there could be war in Sweden.” The Supreme Commander of Swedish Armed Forces, General Per Micael Bydén, reinforced that view, stating that Swedes should prepare mentally for a future war.
• On 24 January, Gen Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the UK General Staff, stated that the British people need to prepare themselves to fight in a war against an increasingly aggressive Russia.
• On 20 March 2024, Wiesław Kukuła, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, echoed statements by Kaupo Rosin, Director of Estonia’s foreign intelligence service, who warned that Russia may be anticipating a conflict with NATO within “the next decade or so.”
• On 4 April, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced plans to increase Germany’s military preparedness to prepare for a future war.  Germany’s Chief of Defense, Lieutenant General Carsten Breuer, reinforced that statement on 18 April, warning that Russia could be prepared for war with NATO in the next five to eight years.

Those statements have created anxiety and met political and societal resistance. Populations and politicians in NATO countries are loath to accept the need to fight Russia in an active war. While some acknowledge the existence of an “information war,” the prospect of a shooting war is too much to swallow.

However, Russian leaders see it differently. In their minds, war with NATO is not a distant theoretical future. It is a current reality. Russian leaders have stated publicly and unambiguously that NATO is already at war with Russia, using Western statements of support and the supply of weapons to Ukraine as evidence. They have repeatedly warned that shipments of military equipment and weapons to Ukraine are legitimate military targets.

• In March 2022, soon after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Western shipments of weapons to Ukraine are legitimate targets.
• In April 2022, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that deliveries of Western weaponry to Ukraine mean that the NATO alliance is “in essence engaged in war with Russia.” 
• Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoigu stated in February 2023 that Western arms deliveries to Ukraine are dragging NATO into the conflict by “openly urging Ukraine to seize our territories,” referring to Ukrainian oblasts the Russia claimed to annex as its own.
• In May 2023, in response to UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly’s statement that Ukraine is justified in projecting power beyond its own borders into Russia to defend itself, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s security council, said Cleverly’s statement proves that the United Kingdom is already in an “undeclared war” with Russia.
• On 28 March 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia could target NATO bases if they host F-16 fighter jets flying combat sorties in Ukraine, while emphasizing that Russia has no plans to attack any NATO country. Using language Russian officials have repeated since the beginning of the war, Putin stated that those bases would be “legitimate targets.”

Russia’s intelligence and covert activities bear witness to Russia’s perceptions of NATO. The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU) (formerly known as the GRU) is tasked with collecting intelligence to support Russian military decision-making and operate behind enemy lines to reduce military threats to Russia. Actions fitting those missions are ongoing in the form of a series of sabotage operations in Poland, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. The operations probably took time to plan and organize, especially after numerous GU officers were expelled from Europe-based Russian embassies in 2022. Consequently, beginning in mid-2023—following closely behind Shoigu’s statements about NATO being a party to the conflict—a series of sabotage operations have targeted NATO assets involved the Ukraine weapons supply chain.

Between March and June 2023, Polish counterintelligence arrested fifteen people who were accused of locating, monitoring, and documenting weapons shipments. The arrestees planted cameras, electronic monitoring equipment, and GPS trackers on weapons transports and roadways heading toward Ukraine. Cameras were found near the Rzeszow-Jasionka airport in southeastern Poland, which visiting U.S. forces use as a transfer point for weapons and ammunition deliveries. Other arrestees were charged with collecting information about critical infrastructure targets in the northern Pomerania and Kuyavia-Pomerania voivodeships, where weapons destined for Ukraine are offloaded. Most of the arrestees were Russians and Belarusians. One was Maksim Sergeyev, a Russian professional ice hockey player, who was specifically named and accused of collecting intelligence on critical infrastructure targets. Polish officials suspect that the operations were run by the GU.

Russian activities in Poland were likely precursors to a series of incidents that occurred in March and May 2024.

On 21 March, a fire broke out in a warehouse in east London. It was later revealed that the warehouse was owned by a Ukrainian businessman who was using it for transshipping weapons to Ukraine. Between 10 and 19 April, British police arrested eight people on suspicion of setting the fire on orders from Moscow. Prosecutors claim that the perpetrators were hired by the Wagner private military corporation, which has connections with the GU.

On 15 April 2024, a fire broke out at a factory in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania.  The factory manufactures artillery shells, some of which are shipped to Ukraine.

On 17 April 2024, an explosion occurred at a factory run by the British defence contractor BAE Systems in Glascoed, Monmouthshire, South Wales. The factory manufactures weapons that are shipped to Ukraine.

On 18 April, a joint Polish and Ukrainian investigation led to the arrest of another individual for collecting information about the security of the Rzeszow-Jasionka airport, similarly to arrests in 2023. The individual was connected to the GU and also accused of plotting to assassinate Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky.

On 18 April, two German-Russian nationals were arrested in Germany on suspicion of plotting sabotage attacks, including on U.S. military facilities. One of the arrestees had reportedly been in contact with a Russian intelligence officer since October 2023 discussing the possibility of conducting sabotage.

On 3 May, a fire broke out at a German factory that manufactures air defence systems supplied to Ukraine.

Identifiable ties to Russia are mixed. Arresting authorities have publicly tied several to Moscow, including to the GU. No direct connection to Russia has been announced in the U.S. and South Wales incidents. However, all fit the Russian definition of “legitimate targets” and align with the GU’s mission of operating covertly behind enemy lines.

For Russian officials, NATO support for Ukraine is not a new phenomenon. Russian military planners have seen themselves at war with NATO since the early 2000s. Russia’s obsession with “colour revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in 2003 to 2005 has reached mythical proportions. Rather than viewing those events as expressions of popular will against autocratic leaders, Russian writers claim they represent active efforts by the United States to exert its power and defeat foreign regimes from the inside. Russian writers have extended the concept of “colour revolutions” to the Arab Spring, which saw the overthrow of autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa.

In his 2013 speech to the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov noted the threat of “colour revolutions” and said, “no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found. He will always have vulnerabilities, and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist.” While some in the West have mistakenly interpreted Gerasimov’s speech as a “doctrine,” it was actually an appeal to the Russian General Staff to develop countermeasures to what Russian politicians saw as a Western onslaught against Russia. Behind-the-lines sabotage is one of those countermeasures.

NATO countries should not be surprised by Russian covert sabotage operations directed at logistics networks shipping weapons to Ukraine. It is a logical and expected extension of Russia’s way of war. Russian officials have telegraphed it publicly. And it is not five to ten years in the future—GU sabotage actions show that it is now.