Intelligence Studies Review

Dr. Neveen Abdalla

In recent weeks, colleagues in the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies have noticed a recurrent, troubling theme in the news: fires or explosions have been (ahem) “accidentally” breaking out at defence-related factories in Western countries. Over a short period, these seemingly sporadic incidents have appeared to increase in frequency, occurring in facilities that are hundreds, sometimes thousands of miles apart. Adjacent to these reports, a second theme emerged as a number of individuals have been arrested for collecting information on sensitive locations in Western countries.

The tie that binds these stories is that each incident targets the supply chain of materiel delivery to Ukraine. Basic supply chain management has five components- planning, procurement, production, storage, and logistics. If we zoom out to the broader picture and squint ever so slightly, we can see what appears to be Russian attempts to disrupt nearly every post-planning stage of the supply chain. It is almost a given that increased Russian presence in mineral-rich sub-Saharan Africa provides opportunities to redirect defence-valuable minerals away from Western nations, affecting procurement.

Dr. Kevin Riehle’s blog, “Russia Is Already at War with NATO, Whether NATO Believes it or Not” astutely highlights attempts to monitor and sabotage activities related to the production, storage and logistics of weapons shipments to Ukraine. Dr Riehle further notes that actions against the latter part of the supply chain are consistent with Russian messaging about what they consider to be legitimate targets.

The threat of Russian sabotage is not a new tactic, as Professor Philip Davies notes in his blog, “Back in Black: the Return of Sabotage As A Challenge for Western Counterintelligence.” The problem, however, is that in the post-Cold War era (and particularly after 9/11), Western governments have largely redirected their focus to non-state actors, remaining sanguine about the balance of global power. This has resulted in diminished capabilities for counterintelligence, counterespionage and countersubversion against state actors.

It occurs to me that these operations serve two purposes. Clearly, they are designed to sabotage weapons delivery to Ukraine. However, the secondary effect is what I refer to as “haemorrhage activities”—attempts to redirect money from finite defence budgets so it is spent on securing each stage of the supply chain. It’s basic opportunity cost— money spent on protecting the supply chain means it cannot be spent elsewhere.

Riehle and Davies’ insights indicate a step-change in the nature of the conflict with Ukraine, and ask a significant question: how do we respond?