Intelligence Studies Review

By: Philip Davies, Steven Wagner, Keven Riehle, Kristian Gustafson, Neveen Abdalla

Beginning on the morning of 7 October, Hamas confronted Israel with what has been described as the ‘most serious attack in a generation’, all but unprecedented in ambition, scale, sophistication and ferocity.  Already the ‘intelligence failure’ chorus is in full voice, and an arms race of compelling and evocative analogies has kicked off. Is it another Yom Kippur? Another 9/11? Yet another Pearl Harbor? 

The correct answer, of course, is that it is none of these. Such comparisons distract any analysis of current events, about which there remain substantial unknowns.  The Hamas October offensive of 2023 is itself, likely destined to become as iconic in retrospect as any of the other three cases, and many others besides.  However, historical analogies have some place in thinking events like this through, partly because they provide handrails of familiarity for us to orient ourselves and partly because they offer cues and clues of where to look for specific kinds of detail that will help us deal with present circumstances. They offer a short-cut and a heuristic but are also hazardous precisely because every case is unique.  Most importantly, while individual cases of intelligence failure are unique, there are distinct and recognisable, and sometimes depressingly consistent, patterns and principles that often underlie them.  As scholar Richard Betts famously observed, individual intelligence failures may be avoidable, but intelligence failure is inevitable.^[1] 

It is, moreover, worth recalling another maxim of the field that every intelligence failure is a counterintelligence success.  If intelligence is the effort to provide our own leaders decision advantage, then counterintelligence is the effort to prevent the adversary’s leaders from achieving a decisive advantage. It appears in this case that Hamas succeeded on both fronts. But on the Israeli side, there appear indeed to have been multiple intelligence failures. They are interrelated and have multiplying effects.

Here are the facts as we appreciate them:

Hamas achieved a substantial surprise. Israeli defences were caught unprepared, on low alert, and unable to respond. This was the result of apparent long-term planning, prodding, and intelligence gathering of their own. It was also the result of apparent weaknesses on the Israeli side. Some of these factors are observable and have been for some time. Others remain unknown. 

For starters, there are basic tactical failures: security on shabbat morning, especially on holidays, is generally seen by conscripts as likely to be quiet, and an undesirable obligation. The IDF garrison around Gaza has been weakened by events in the West Bank. Multiple commentators and journalists have remarked upon the unpreparedness of the 143 “Gaza” Division. Amid the rise of non-partisan Palestinian “brigade” units in the Nablus-Tulkarem-Jenin area, and ongoing settler provocations, three battalions were recently relocated there from Gaza to reinforce security over the holidays. There is also evidence of a repeating Israeli “konseptsia” or preconception: that Hamas preferred to avoid direct confrontation, to deal with economic problems and its own administrative interests rather than risk further destruction.^[2] This notion has (now obviously) been fostered by Hamas’s seemingly timid responses to clashes over the past two years. Amid the carnage, the smell of deception hangs in the air. 

Some obvious signs of Hamas planning and preparation also help explain surprise. Videos emerged of Hamas’s assault on various crossing points at the Gaza border. This is a remarkable tactical achievement as it requires overcoming several layers of automated detection systems in the air, on the ground, and underground. These are monitored remotely and locally, passively and actively, and are defended with soldiers on the spot, overwatched by guard towers and remote-controlled machine-guns.^[3] It gives true meaning to the Palestinian grievance that Gaza is an open-air prison.

Yet Hamas’s ability to breach the barriers so readily leads to one of two hypotheses. This was likely the result of years of reconnaissance, prodding for weaknesses, testing defences under the guise of demonstrations, and stockpiling explosives and heavy equipment. It is also possible that this was aided by a technical achievement which blinded this layered defence. With Israel planning in the near future to implement a laser-defence system designed to eliminate rockets, mortars, and drones,^[4] this was perhaps Hamas’s last chance to pull off an attack. Substantial tactical preparation is apparent too. Fighters in videos seem to know where they are going and what they are looking for. Everything is well timed, and covered by an effective fire control,^[5] or at least a well-timed fire schedule. Mortar fire covered most movements while concentrated rocket fire exhausted or overwhelmed missile defences. The targeting also illuminates substantial preparation and Hamas intelligence collection – multiple crossing points were overrun. Targets were selected to disrupt command and control. Unfortunately for the civilians butchered and kidnapped, this appears to have been very effective. 

Hamas’s Qassam Brigades quickly overran the Gaza Division headquarters in Mahane Ra’im. The Gaza Division – already under-strength – suffered substantial damage and loss to its armour, AFVs, and APCs, and other lighter transport was apparently stolen. But the near 12-hour loss of control over a division HQ brings substantial intelligence risks and failures with it: The IDF must now assume that its printed documents, computer systems, data, signals equipment, and other sensitive media and reports are now compromised, even if they weren’t exfiltrated. At this level, this has the potential for long term security and intelligence disaster. In the short term, as some 300,000 reservists are mobilised for service on three fronts, the staff planning whatever comes next cannot assume security. 

So, what has materialised is a combination of Hamas’s planning and preparation and operational security, and possible technical/intelligence successes, alongside operational strain on the IDF and its attention-bandwidth and some basic errors of judgement in their assessment of an enemy. 

The intelligence failure questions that need to be asked in the wake of this October offensive include:

1. Which known patterns and principles have been at work on this specific moment of surprise? What forced or unforced faults affected Israel’s intelligence efforts directed at Hamas? In other words, what underlay the intelligence failure?

• How did Hamas manage to evade the substantial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance efforts and capabilities that Israel has been directing at Gaza over the decades? That is, how did they achieve counterintelligence success?

Moreover, the idea of ‘intelligence failure’ covers a multitude of sins, be they of commission or omission. There may be failures of prediction, such as failures of ‘warning intelligence’ leading to short-term surprise, or of ‘estimative intelligence’ forecasting leading to longer term policy miscalls or poor preparation.  In real- and near-real time there can be failures of current intelligence to provide an accurate picture of what is going on and where, and even retrospective failures, especially of ‘basic’ or ‘building block’ intelligence to lay down a robust and accurate fundamental understanding of one’s rivals, adversaries and enemies.  Failure could also be the result of the bigotry of low expectations— where warning signs are missed because one underestimates an adversary’s capabilities and overestimates their risk-adversity. Mirror imaging may cause an observer to assume that a group would not act, because the observer could not imagine doing so if the roles were reversed. And, of course, all of this is set against the efforts of those rivals, adversaries and enemies to deny the acquisition of good intelligence, and to deceive those engaged in its acquisition and exploitation.

It seems highly likely that, in October 2023, Israel has experienced significant failings at all of these levels of intelligence.  And Hamas has displayed a profoundly and consistently underestimated competence at both collecting intelligence to support its own operation and of denial and deception. Perhaps the most grievous failure is the net assessment: comparing one’s own will and ability to achieve an aim as compared to your opponent. Self-assessment is notoriously difficult, but was likely compounded in this case by temporary tactical weakness. Israeli assessments of Hamas’s will, intentions, and perhaps certain capabilities were clearly wrong.

Although not all surprise is intelligence failure —and this one does not fit neatly into any theoretical model or historical example— it does borrow features from them: especially preconceptions, and possibly deception.

^[1] Richard K. Betts, Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (October 1978), 61-89.

^[2] The quote supporting this observation has been removed. It is found still here and here.

^[3] According to those who served there. Hamas has posted imagery of its drone’s role in disabling these defences. https://x.com/AsaadHannaa/status/1711037431112196543?s=20. 

^[4] Mikayla Easley, Israeli-Made High-Energy Laser Makes Debut, National Defense, 21 March 2023.

^[5] A pattern emerged during media interviews, and a variety of videos, which suggest this conclusion.